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6244 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HAR~IAN, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and :MAY C. 
YEAGER, his wife, FRIEDA 
MURPHY, HILDA RICHES, 
REKA CUMMINGS, OLIVE G. 
FOX, E L S I E NORDBERG, 
HORACE L. HARLINE and 
LORINE HARLINE, his wife, 
LERO... G. HARLINE (Also No. 6244 
sppll "LEORY" G. HAR-
.~) and ALBERT HAR-
LINE, his wife, LEIGH A. HAR-
LINE and KATHERINE HAR-
LINE, his Wife, OSCAR J. 
HARLINE and LORENA HAR-
LINE, his Wife, OSROW L. 
TILBY and SELMA TILBY, his 
Wife, Defendants. 
Abstract and Brief of Appellants 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Hon. Allen G. Thurman, Judge 
~, .. ~ . '"' , HE :1 : . · .' IOD U E· ... ,-..·~· ft';~··" . :.~ I · .· . ' ~1' Appellants. 
IIIITURY nJRTIII. CO. 
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In the District Court of tbe Tbird Judicial District 
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
MARY A. HAR~IAN, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C. 
YEAGE·R, his wife, FRIEDA 
:MURPHY, HILDA RICHES, 
REKA CUM~IINGS, OLIVE G. 
FOX, E L S IE NORDBERG, 
HORACE L. HARLINE and 
LORINE HARLINE, his wife, COMPLAINT 
LEROY G. HARLINE (Also 
spelled "LEORY" G. HAR- 62659 
LINE) and ALBERT BAR-
LINE, his wife, LEIGH A. BAR-
LINE and KATHERINE HAR-
LINE, his Wife, OSCAR J. 
HARLINE and LORENA BAR-
LINE, his Wife, OSROW L. 
TILBY and SEL~IA TILBY, his 
Wife, Defendants. 
ABSTRACT AND BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Plaintiff complains of the defendants and for a 
cause of action alleges : 
1. The persons named in the caption as ''his 
wife" are severally the wife of the defendant whose 
name immediately precedes the name o~ such wife. 
2. The name of the persons spelled '' Harline '' in 
the caption is also spelled "Harlene" and the two 
are pronounced alike. 
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3. The name of defendant Leroy G. Harline IS 
also sometimes spelled '' Leory'' G. Harlin e. 
4. That plaintiff is the owner and lawfully pos-
sessed of the following described real property situ-
ated in S'alt Lake County, State of Utah, reference 
being made to the recorded plate therein mentioned of 
record in the Recorder's office of said county, viz: 
Beginning at a point 148.55 feet south of the 
Northwest corner of Lat 8, in Block 22, Plat 
''A'', Big Field Survey, and running thence 
North 76,775 feet; thence East 46 rods; thence 
South 79.775 feet; thence westerly 46 rods, more 
or less to the place of beginning. 
5. That the said defendant and each of them claim 
some right, title or interest in or to the said described 
premises or some part thereof, adversely to this plain-
tiff and without right. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against 
the said defendants and each of them, that they be 
required to answer and plead what, if any, right, title 
or interest they have, claim or assert in or to the said 
described premises or any part thereof; that ·plaintiff's 
title and right of possession of said premises may be 
quieted and defendants and each of them be enjoined 
from claiming the same or any part thereof; for gen-
eral relief and for the costs of this action. 
PAUL G. ELLIS, J. PATTON NEELEY, 
Attorneys fot· Plaintiff. 
(Duly Verified.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, ~ 
ALBERT YEAGER and others, 
Defendants. 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
vs. Demurrer 
To the plaintiff and her attorneys, Ellis and Neeley : 
Comes now the defendants, Albert Yeager and May 
C. Yeager, and demurers to the complaint of the plain-
tiff and for ground of demur alleges that the com-
plaint does not state £acts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action against these defendants. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 24th day of 
April, 1939. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants 
Albert Yeager and M·ay C. Yeager. 
I, L. E. Cluff, Attorney for defendants, Albert 
Yeager and May C. Yeager, certifies that in my opin-
ion the general demurrer above is well taken; filed in 
good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. April 24th, 1939. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney. 
Received a copy of this 24th day of April 1939. 
J. P. Neeley. P. G. Ellis. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and others, 
Defenda;nts. 
Answer 
62659 
In answer to the complaint of the plaintiff, these 
defendants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, admit, 
deny and alleges: 
1. Not having any knowledge or information suf-
ficient to form a belief these defendants deny the al-
legations in paragraphs one, two and three, except as 
to the allegations that these defendants herein are hus-
band and wife which defendants admit. 
2. In answer to paragraph four these defendants 
alleg·e that on and immediately prior to the 18th day 
of November, 19·32, these defendants were legal owners 
and in possession of 
The North 1f2 of the North :lj2 of Lot 8, Block 22, 
Ten Acre Plat "A", Big F'ield Survey contain-
ing two and one-half acres of land; 
that on or about said day these defendants executed 
and delivered to rplaintiff a deed conveying part of 
the property described above, said property being so 
conveyed being described as follows, to wit: 
Beginning at a point 8.7 rods (143.55 feet) 
South of the Northwest corner of Lot 8, Block 
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~2, Ten Acre Plat "A" Big Field Survc~' and 
running thence North 4.32 (amended to 4.35 by 
permission of Court) rods ; thence East 46 rods ; 
thence South 4.35 rods; thence West 46 rods to 
the place of beginning being the South 0 of the 
North 14 of said Lot 8, containing 1;4 acres, 
more or less together with 11;4 share of stock 
in Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co .• 
That dividing the property so conveyed from the prop-
erty retained a fence had been constructed by the de-
fendants and was standing at the time of the convey-
ance above mentioned and that said plaintiff has been 
in possession of the property conveyed south of the 
said fence and no part of the plaintiff (defendants 1) 
land has been in the possession of said plaintiff. 
3. That so far as any conflict exists between prop-
erty described above and within the fence line as here-
inabove described these defendants deny the allega· 
tions of said plaintiff's complaint and the whole thereof 
and alleges that plaintiff is not entitled to any part 
or portion of the said North 1j2 of the North 11:::~ of the 
North ¥2. of Lot 8, Block 22, Ten Acre Plat A, Big 
Field Survey, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
WHEREFORE these defendants pray that the 
plaintiff take nothing by her action so far as the 
property described of defendants and only that prop-
erty conveyed to plaintiff and that these defendants 
have their costs herein expended. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants 
(Duly Verified.) 
Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD J" 
DICIAL DirSTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
Minute Entry. 
Entered Order 
Case Number 
62659 Dated 
September 6, 
1939 
ALLEN G. 
THURMAN, 
JUDGE 
This case comes now on for trial, Paul G. Ell 
and J. Patton Neeley, attorneys appearing in beha 
of the plaintiff, L. E. Cluff, attorney appearing in b 
half of the defendants Albert and May C. Yeager. T1 
case is argued to the Court by respective counsE 
Comes now counsel for plaintiff and moves the con 
for a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plai 
tiff and against the defendants Albert Yeager and M~ 
C. Yeager, and for judgment on the answer and stip· 
lation of facts subscribed to by the plaintiff and r 
maining defendants, except Albert and May C. Yeage 
setting the boundary line between their properties ar 
said motion is by the Court granted. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plaint-iff, 
YS. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C. 
YEAGER, his Wife, and others, 
Defendants. 
Motion to Va-
cate Decree and 
for Permission 
to Amend 
Answer 
To the Plaintiff and her attorneys, P. G. Ellis and J. 
Patton Neeley, Esqs: 
Please take notice that the defendants, Albert 
Yeager and ~fay G. Yeager, intends to move the court 
to vacate the decree entered in the above entitled action 
and to permit the defendant to amend answer. Said 
motion to be based on the following grounds, to wit: 
1. No time was allowed defendants to file ob-
jections to Trial Minutes as prepared by attorneys for 
Plaintiff in accordance with requirements of Rule XIII 
of Rules of Practice in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District. 
2. No time allowed Defendants to Amend Answer 
after Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. 
3. The decree is contrary to law. 
4. That it was contrary to law to allow Plaintiff 
to have Judgment on the Pleadings since denial in 
Answer is sufficient to raise an issue. 
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5. The Judgment is contrary to l~aw and the court 
erred in entering Judgment on the Pleadings since in 
making the motion by plaintiff, the court have treated 
the denial as sufficient and the case should have gone 
to trial and plaintiff required to offer evidence in sup-
port of complaint. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 22nd day of 
September, 1939. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants. 
Received a copy of thB above this 25th day of Septem-
ber, 1939. 
Ellis & Neeley, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF, UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plarintijf, 
vs. 
lLBERT YE~GER and MAY G. 
YEAGER, his Wife, and others, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
To the Plaintiff and her Attorneys, P. G. Ellis and J. 
Patton Neeley, Esqs: 
Take notice, that defendants, Albert Yeager and 
May G. Yeager, intend to move the court to vacate 
and set aside the decision rendered in the above cause, 
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and to grant a new trial of said cause, upon the fol-
lowing grounds, to wit: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court. 
2. Irregularity in the Order of the Court. 
3. Abuse of discretion by which defendants were 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
-i. Accident and surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the de-
cision. 
6. That the decision of the court is against law. 
7. Error in law occurring at the trial. 
Said motion will be made upon affidavits hereafter to 
be filed and served upon you or a statement of the 
cause to be hereafter prepared or upon the minutes 
of the court in said cause. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 22nd Day of 
September, 1939. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for Defendants 
Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager. 
Received a copy of the above this 25th day of Septem-
ber, 1939. 
Ellis & Neeley, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C. 
YEAGER, his Wife, et al., 
Defendwnts. 
DECREE 
62659 
The Court having heretofore ordered the entry 
of a decree in favor of the plaintiff above named 
against the defendant Yeager in conformity to the 
Court's order sustaining a motion of plaintiff for judg-
ment in her favor against the defendants Albert Yea-
ger (whose full name is Albert L. Yeager) and May C. 
Yeager, his Wife; and also upon plaintiff's motion for 
a judgment or decree in her favor .against the remain-
ing defendants named in the caption hereto, which the 
Court did likewise sustain, settling boundaries, and 
quieting plaintiff's title, and enjoining claims or acts 
of the defendants contrary thereto; NOW THERE-
FORE: 
1. It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the 
Court that the plaintiff has good title in fee simple 
to the following described real property situate in Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, reference being 
made to the recorded rna ps and plats therein mentioned 
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of record in the office of the County Recorder for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, for further precision in detail, to 
wit: 
"Beginning at a point which is 148.55 feet south 
of the northwest corner of lot 8, in block 22, 
Ten-acre plat A, Big Field Survey, and running 
thence north 76.775 feet to a point which is 4.35 
rods or 71.775 feet south of said northwest cor-
ner of said Lot 8; thence east or easterly 46 
rods; thence south 79.775 feet to a point which is 
151.55 feet south of the northeast corner of said 
lot 8, in block 22, 10-acre Plat A Big Field Sur-
vey, thence west or westerly 46 rods to the 
place of beginning.'' 
Together with all improvements thereon, 
and all hereditaments and appurtenances there-
unto belonging, and also together with 11~ share 
of stock in the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal 
Company, and all water and water rights repre-
sented by said 11~ share of stock. 
And that plaintiff is in possession and has full rights of 
possession in and to all the above described premises. 
2. That the defendants and each one of them, to 
wit: Albert Yeager (whose full name is Albert L. 
Yeager) and May C. Yeager, his wife . . . . have not, 
nor have either or any or more of them any right, title 
or interest, lawful claim or right to the possession o£ 
the premises described in paragraph 1 of this decree, 
or any part thereof, or to the improvements thereon, 
or the water or water rights :pertaining to said ]1~ 
share of stock in the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal 
Company, or to said 11~ share of stock, or the certifi-
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cate therefor; or to the hereditaments and appurten-
ances unto said real property appertaining; and they 
and each and every one of the said named defendants 
are hereby enjoined and restrained from ever hereafter 
making or asserting any claim of right, title or interest 
in, or right to the possession of, or to interfere in any 
way with plaintiff's title and right of possession of the 
said premises and every part thereof that is described 
above and in the .foregoing parts of this decree, and 
to the title and right of possession of plaintiff's heirs, 
assigns, grantees, privies and personal representatives. 
3. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by 
the court that whereas the above named defendants 
other than the said Albert L. Yeager and May C. Yea-
ger, have not defended this action, but have disclaimed 
any interest adversely to the •plaintiff as described in 
her complaint herein, the plaintiff is not entitled to 
costs as against those defendants, and no decree is 
awarded plaintiff against them. 
4. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that plaintiff Mary A. Harman have and recover judg-
ment against the defendants A1bert L. Yeager and May 
C. Yeager her costs herein incurred and taxed at 
$ .................................... . 
5. It is further ordered and decreed that plain-
tiff's title to the premises described in paragraph 2 
hereof, and each ~and every part and parcel thereof, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
is hereby quieted in her as against all and every ad-
verse claim of the said defendants, and each of them. 
Allen G. Thurman, Judge. 
Dated Oct. 18, 1939. 
ReceiY·ed a copy this Sept. 6th A. D. 1939. 
L. E. Cluff, Attorney for defendants 
Yeager. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY G. 
YEAGER, his Wife, et al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF 
MOTION 
To the Plaintiff and to her counsel, P. G. Ellis and 
J. Patton N·eeley: 
You and each of you will please take notice that on 
Saturday the 18 day of November, 1939, at the hour 
of 10 o'clock A. M. of said date or as soon thereafter 
a scounsel may be heard, the defendants Albert Yea-
ger and May G. Yeager, will move the above entitled 
court to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and 
permission to amend answer heretofore ,filed, upon the 
grounds therein stated and also upon the grounds of: 
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1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court and 
the orders of the court by which plaintiff's were given 
judgment and defendants were prevented from having 
a fair trial; 2) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against; 3) Newly 
discovered evidence, material for the party making this 
application, which could not with reasonable diligence, 
be discovered and produced at the trial; 4) Insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify the verdict or de-
cision, said decision being against law, and 5) Error 
in law occurring at the trial, which was excepted to, and 
said motion will be based further upon the files and 
records of the above cause, and upon the affidavits, 
testimony and ·evidence to be adduced on behalf of de-
fendants at said hearing. 
F. HENRI HIDNRIOD 
Attorney for Defendants Albert & May Yeager. 
Received copy of the foregoing notice this 2nd day of 
November, 1939. 
NEELEY & ELLIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C. 
YEAGER, his Wife, et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
ANSWER 
Filed in connec-
tion with motion 
to reconsider de-
fendant's m o -
tion to vacate 
decree and for 
permission 
to amend an-
swer. 
(Note: Def-endants tendered in connection with their 
motion to reconsider motions to vacate judgment, 
new trial and for permission to amend, and in con-
nection with their motions to set aside and vacate 
judgment, and in connection with their motion for 
new trial (Tr. 82), an amended answer which in 
subst~ance contained the following (Tr. 47 to 53 
inclusive) : 
1. Admit allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of 
complaint. 
2. Deny generally and specifically every other al-
legation of the complaint not otherwise specifically 
admitted or denied. 
For an affinnative defense and praying for affir-
mative relief, defendants allege: 
1. Residence of the parties. 
2. That in 1929 defendants were owners and pos-
sessed of the property in question, together with other 
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property, which they had obtained by deed from Carl 
Harlin e. 
3. That thereafter and on November 19th, 1932, 
defendants deeded to plaintiff the following: 
Beginning at ·a point 8. 7 rods South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 8, Block 22, Ten Acre 
Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence 
North 4.35 rods; thence East 46 rods ; thence 
South 4.35 rods; thence West 46 rods to the 
place of beginning, being the South 1/2 of the 
North 1/2 of said Lot 8. Together with 11;4 share 
of stock in Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Com-
pany. 
4. That for 75 years a fence stood continuously 
on or near the north boundary of Lot 8:, and same is 
still standing; that defendants originally obtained their 
property based on the assumption that said fence was 
on the boundary line of Lot 8; that when defendants 
conveyed to plaintiff it was the intention to measure 
the property by starting at said fence line as the true 
boundary of Lot 8; that when defendants conveyed to 
plaintiff there was another fence separating the lot in-
tended to he conveyed to plaintiff and that intended to be 
retained by defendants; that said fence separating the two 
lots had been in place for several years prior to the con-
veyance and is still in place; that at the time of said 
conveyance plaintiff accepted the property on the south 
side of this dividing fence and intended to receiv·e only 
the property south thereof, and for many years occu-
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pied only said property without complaint of any na-
ture; that said dividing fence was erected in 1929 and 
was placed where it is by measuring from the fence 
on the north of defendants' property, which had been 
in place for 75 years; that neither the plaintiff nor de-
fendants intended to receive or conyey any other prop-
erty than that south of the dividing fence. 
5. That the conveyance from defendants to plain-
tiff was based on the assumption by both plaintiff and 
defendants that the partition fence mentioned was to be 
and was the true boundary line between the properties 
after said conveyance, and that if said partition fence 
were not the true boundary line it was treated as such 
b:' plaintiff and defendants, and if it were not the true 
boundary line, there was a mutual mistake; that said 
partition f.ence was 1neasured from the 75 year old 
fence on or near the north boundary of Lot 8; that 
measuring from any other line did not and would not 
constitute the conveyance agreed upon by plaintiff and 
defendants; that any variance other than established 
by the fence lines was a mutual mistake and would 
affect the substantial rights of the parties; that de-
fendants have no adequate or s·peedy remedy at law, 
and will suffer irreparable damage unless equity estab-
lishes the boundary set by the fence lines; that the mis-
take, if any there be, did not arise from any act or 
omission of defendants, but was based on the assump-
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tion and intention of plaintiff and defendants alike that 
the fences were the boundaries. 
6. That the description set forth in plaintiff's 
complaint de,scribes property greatly in excess of that 
mentioned in the conveyance from defendants to plain-
tiff and there is a variance both as to size and shape 
of the property. 
7. That for at least 15 years there have been a 
fence and ditch on the south of the property occupied 
by plaintiff, and that plaintiff and defendants at all 
times treated this fence and ditch as the south boun-
dary of plaintiff's propeTty; that they were established 
by measuring from the fence supposed to be the north 
boundary line of Lot 8, and had measurement been 
taken from any other point said fence and ditch would 
not have been established at their present situs; that 
plaintiff claims her property to said fence and ditch 
on the south, which were measured from the fence sup-
posed to be on the north line of Lot 8, and at the same 
time claims that the partition fence between her prop-
erty and defendants' is not the true boundary, though 
measured from the same point, and thereby plaintiff 
is seeking equity and not doing equity. 
8. That for more than 10 years next last past the 
defendants have occupied the premises north of the 
partition fence and have cultivated said property, plant-
ing flowers and crops thereon, building structures there-
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on, and protecting the same, ·and have held said prop-
erty up to said partition fence adversely to the plain~ 
tiff and all the world for said ten years, and have oc-
cupied sam.e under claim of title based on fence lines 
and natural monuments, improving same, paying taxes 
thereon for more than said 10 years, as did their pre-
decessors in title, and that defendants' possession dur-
ing said time has been open, notorious, uninterrupted 
and peaceable under claim of right, save and except as 
qualified by the above entitled cause. 
9. That the partition fence between plaintiff's and 
defendants' properties was at the time of conveyance 
the agreed boundary line separating the properties, 
and that said fence was then in place and is now in 
place. 
10. That for many years after plaintiff received 
and accepted said property divided by said partition 
fence, said plaintiff treated ~<!.}>artition fence as the 
true boundary line and ma~~bjection or claim for 
any property north of said partition fence and repre-
sented for many years to defendants and others that 
said fence was the true boundary line, and defendants 
believed said representations and acted thereon and 
plaintiff knew defendants would act thereon and per-
mitted defendants to plant shrubs on said property and 
build structures thereof and cultivate crops thereon, to 
the expense of defendants, and that defendants acted 
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in good faith, and plaintiff is estopped from asserting 
any claim to property north of said partition fence. 
1.1. That these defendants are the owners and 
occupants of all of the property contained between said 
partition fence and the fence on or near the north 
boundary of Lot 8, Block 22, Flat A, Big Field Survey, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; that the plaintiff 
asserts to have some claim or interest in a part ther·eof, 
but that plaintiff's claim is without any right what-
soever. 
WHEREFOR.E, defendans pray that plaintiff take 
nothing by virtue of her complaint, and that a judg-
ment be entered in favor of defendants quieting their 
title to the property up to the partition fence herein 
mentioned, and that a decree be entered reforming 
the deed mentioned herein in paragraph 3, to conform 
to the intentions of the parties and reforming the de-
scription in said deed, which is in the possession of plain-
tiff,to conform with the intentions of the parties with re-
spect to natural monuments and fence lines, and that 
a decree be entered establishing the boundary line in 
accordance with the allegations herein contained, and 
for any further and additional relief, which in the dis-
cretion of this court seems just, reasonable and equit-
able, including costs. 
F. Henri Henriod, Attorney for Albert Yeager and 
May C. Yeager, Defendants. 
(Duly Verified). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. HARM~, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C. 
YEAGER, his Wife, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
62659 
(Note: Affidavit tendered by defendant, Albert Yeager 
in connection with motions to vacate judgment, new 
trial and for permsision to amend, and in connec-
tion with motions to set aside and vacate judgment, 
and for new trial (Tr. 82), in substance as fol-
lows ( Tr. 54-61 inclusive) : 
STATE OF UTAH - ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ~ SS 
1. That he is one of the defendants herein; that 
he incorporates herein the reasons assigned in motion 
to vacate decree and for permission to amend answer. 
2. That affiant has not had access to any accred-
ited survey; that what surveys have been made are 
conflicting, and it is impossible to determine the boun-
dary line of Lot 8 from said surveys; that affiant has 
at all times assumed that the north boundary of Lot 
8 was marked by a fence which has been in position for 
75 years; that said f·ence was not heretofore mentioned 
in the pleadings because affiant assumed plaintiff's 
claim was based on measurement from said 75 year old 
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fence, and it was impossible to determine that plaintiff 
made any other claim for property, and affiant could 
not determine with due diligence that plaintiff intended 
to base her claim on any other theory than measure-
ment from said fence, and that therefore affiant's fail-
ure to plead the exact position of said fence line was 
excusahl·e neglect, and affiant wishes to amend said 
pleadings to conform to the facts; that affiant believes 
and states that plaintiff, at the time of accepting deed 
to said property, thought that said description was 
based on measurement from said fence line. 
3. That at the time the Court heard said motions 
and granted motion for judgment on the pleadings for 
plaintiff, there was an excusable misunderstanding 
concerning the starting point for measurement of said 
properties, the defendants assuming that said point was 
said boundary fence, and the plaintiff asserting some-
thing different, without either party mentioning said 
fence, and that any stipulation of boundary was based 
on misunderstanding; that because of said misunder-
standing there was a mutual mistake of fact making 
it appear that the parties were agreed on the line when 
i~ fact they were not; that it was impossible for de-
fendants at said tim.e to determine that said misunder-
standing existed; that no sworn testimony of any na-
ture was ever taken at the trial; that the motion for 
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judgment on the pleadings was granted solely on state-
ments of counsel, and the property rights of the parties 
affected by default and without taking of evidence, 
which i~ contrary to the statutes of Utah; that affiant 
is desirous of presenting an amended answer setting 
forth the facts and praying for reformation of the 
deed. 
4. That there is a fatal variance in plaintiff's 
complaint and the decree with respect to the description 
of the property, the complaint stating that the prop-
erty claimed by plaintiff runs 
" .... North 76,775 feet (among other things)" 
(Tr. 56) 
and the decree states that it runs: 
'' .... North 76.775 feet (among other things) '' 
(Tr. 56) 
the said description in the complaint varying greatly 
as to size and shape with that set forth in the decree. 
5. That when the Court inquired of plaintiff's 
counsel if plaintiff claimed anything north of the line 
described in the deed and the answer was "No", affi-
ant herein assumed that the answer was based on a 
description whose starting point was the 75 year old 
fence; and that affiant likewise assumed the answer of 
counsel for defendants, being ''No" was based on the 
same fact; that had there been an understanding with 
respect to basis for measurement counsel for defen-
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dants' answer would have been "Yes"; that it is 
inequitable to grant judgment on the pleadings upon 
such misunderstanding, and without first having heard 
sworn testimony and evidence ; that had such evidence 
been required, affiant believes and asserts that such 
misunderstanding would have been made obvious and 
that amendment of the r>leadings would have been al-
lowed and a trial had on the merits, and defendants' 
prayer amended to include a request for reformation, 
if a true survey should show that the north boundary 
of Lot 8 was not the 75 year old fence. 
6. That affiant believes that the Court, on hearing 
the statement of counsel, thought the parties were in 
agreement as to the boundary, but that such was not 
the case; that no evidence or testimony was introduced 
to show the boundary intended, and that if such evi-
dence had been introduced the court would not hav·e 
given judgment on the pleadings and would have per-
mitted an amendment of defendants' answer, and had 
evidence been introduced showing plaintiff had occupied 
and accepted her property based on said fence line and 
said partition fence, amendment would have been al-
lowed; that the Court's ruling was based on mutual 
mistake and misunderstanding, on complete lack of 
sworn testimony and evidence, and constituted inadver-
tence and excusable neglect. 
7. That affiant believes and states defendants have 
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an affirmativ.e defense based on prescription and ad-
verse possession, which affiant would have asserted 
but for said misunderstanding with respect to measur-
ing points; that defendants have occupied the property 
on the north of the partition fence at all times since 
and before 1932, have paid taxes thereon and improved 
the same, and such facts would have appeared had tes-
timony been taken. 
8. That the court's giving judgment on the plead-
ings constituted accident or surprise because of the 
misunderstanding, as was the assumption by plaintiff 
and eounsel for plaintiff that there was a different 
measuring point than said fence; that affiant did not 
know at said hearing that there was a diff.erence of 
opinion as to starting points and did not discover smne 
until after said hearing. 
9. That affiant has newly discovered evidence, 1n 
this: That other nearby property owners whose prop-
erty is described by starting from said fence, have 
stated that they considered their property as being 
measured from said fence and that this is shown by the 
disclaimer filed by some of the defendants in this 
cause, the disclaimants' property having been measured 
by said fence line and disclaimants assuming that the 
fences were the true boundaries; that plaintiff, in ob-
taining such disclaimer is using the fence lines as a 
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basis for measurement, and in making claim from affi-
ant is attempting to use another basis for measurement, 
and in so doing is seeking equity but not doing equity. 
10. That there was insufficiency of evidence to 
support judgment on the pleadings, there having been 
no evidence introduced on behalf of either plaintiff or 
defendant. 
11. That there was error in law in granting mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings and refusing to 
grant defendants' motion for a new trial. 
12. That affiant has newly discovered evidence, 
in this: That plaintiff's complaint calls for more prop-
erty than does her deed; that said complaint is based 
on a private, unofficial survey, which defendants could 
not anticipate and of which def.endants did not know 
until after said hearing; that affiant believes said sur-
vey to be inaccurate. 
13. That ·affiant has newly discovered evidence 
in this: That affiant has discovered that other nearby 
property owners customarily received one share of 
water stock to one acre of ground; that affiant's deed 
to plaintiff called for 114 shares and 114 acres of 
ground; that plaintiff's complaint calls for more than 
114 acr-es of ground. 
Albert Yeager 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of No-
Yember, 1939. 
F. Henri Henriod, Notary Public residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Received copy of the foregoing affidaYit this 18th day 
of Xov., 1939. 
J. Patton Neeley & P. G. Ellis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
ASSIGX!\IEXTS OF ERROR 
Come now Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, de-
fendants in the above entitled cause, and except to and 
assign as error the Court's 1) overruling defendants' 
demurrer, :May lst, 1939, 2) judgment on pleadings, 
September 6th, 1939, 3) trial minutes signed by Judge 
based on hearing September 6th, 19:39, 4) written de-
cree quieting title in plainteiff, dated and filed Octo-
ber 18th, 1939, 5) denial of defendants' motions to set 
aside decree and permit amendment of answer, Octo-
ber 14th, 1939, and denial of motion for new trial, Octo-
ber 14, 1939, 6) denial of motion to re-consider mo-
tion for new trial, motion for new trial and motion to 
vacate judgment, February 6th, 1940, and 7) denial 
of defendants' motion to an1end answer, September 6th, 
1939, and to all other orders and rulings of the Court 
in said cause, made and entered adversely to and ob-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
jected to by Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, de-
fendants. 
F. Henri Henriod, Attorney for Defend-
ants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager, 
his Wife. 
The within and foregoing Bill of Exceptions, to-
gether with the changes and corrections referred to in 
the objection, heretofore presented to the Court, is 
hereby settled, approved and allowed, this 21st day of 
March, 1940, as and for the bill of' ex0eption in the 
within cause. 
Allen G. Thurman. 
(S.eal) 
Pursuant to argument on motions to re-consider 
motion for new trial, to vacate judgment and permis-
sion to amend pleadings, on November 18th, 1939·, F. 
Henri Henriod, counsel for defendants, moved the 
Court also: 1) To set aside the judgment, 2) for a new 
trial (Tr. 82), and Mr. Neeley, counsel for plaintiff 
stated ''I won't object to those motions; they may go 
into the record.'' ( Tr. 82). The Court set Wednesday. 
December 6th, 1939, to hear evidence in support of 
affidavit in support of motions (Tr. 84). On December 
6th, hearing was had, counsel for plaintiff objecting to 
introduction of any testimony in support of the affi-
davit, and was overruled. (Tr. 84). 
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Oscar J. Harline was sworn and examined and tes-
tified (Tr. 8:5, et seq.) that he was agent for property 
south of plaintiff's; that there was a fence between his 
and plaintiff's property for 17 years, and that it has 
been there, he thought since a little after 1892 (Tr. 86); 
that there has been a ditch there about the same length 
of time (Tr. 87); that he considered this fence and ditch 
as the dividing line or north line of his property (Tr. 
87 and 90); that his father owned the entire tract, and 
sold the north half about 1922; that he lived in the 
district at that time; that he knows there is a fence 
between the Harman (plaintiff) ·and Yeager ( defen-
dants') property, and that it has been there five years 
or probably more; that he knows of a fence on the 
north of the defendants' property that continues the 
whole length of the block and that this fence has been 
ther.e fifty years or more (Tr. 92); that he was one of 
the defendants in this action and signed a paper (dis-
claimer) to l\lrs. Harman establishing the old fence 
line; that at no time did he consider that he had an 
interest north of the f-ence and ditch line (Tr. 93); 
that he is acquainted with other properties in the 
vicinity and knows that one share of water goes with 
one acre of ground (Tr. 93); that he is selling the north 
half of the south half of Lot 8 to a Mr. Tilby, and 
that in doing so he was using the fence and ditch line 
as the boundary of the property and that Mr. Tilby 
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was dealing on the same basis ; that in all of the trans-. 
actions with which he is acquainted the fence lines have 
been considered as the true boundaries ( Tr. 94). 
Mrs. Jessie B. Ence was sworn and examined and 
testified that she was owner of property in the vicinity 
on the west of 11th East (Tr. 94); that the south line 
of her property was even with the north line of the 
Yeager property; that there has always been a fence 
on this line since she lived there, which has been for 
20 years (Tr. 95); that she has always considered this 
fence line the correct line (Tr. 96) ; that she is no rela-
tion to Yeagers, but is a neighbor; that there is a ditch 
along her south line; that she received water shares 
when she bought the property and bought five acres 
and received five shares (Tr. 96); that one share of 
water goes with one acre of ground. 
Thereupon Mr. Henriod stated that h_e would like 
to ask Mrs. Harman (the plaintiff) a question or two, to 
which counsel for Mrs. Harman objected. Thereafte1· 
the abstract of title was introduced by counsel for de-
fendants, and abstract of title was introduced by coun-
sel for plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction: This case concerns itself with a com-
plaint setting forth allegations designed to quiet title 
to certain property described therein. A demurrer there-
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to was overruled, and the defendants filed an answer 
in substance stating that certain property was described 
in a deed executed and delivered b~~ defendants to 
plaintiff on or about November 18th, 1932; that 
"divid·ing the property so co-nveyed from the p·rop-
erty retained, a fence had bee11 constructed by the de-
fendants and Lras standing at the time of the convey-
ance above mentioned a-nd that said plaintiff ha-s been 
in possession of the property conveyed south of the 
said fence and no part of the plaintiff (defendants'?) 
land has been in the possession of sa.id pla.intiff" 
and that "so far a,s any conflict exists between/ prop-
erty described above and wi-thin the fence line as here-
inabove described, these defendants deny the allegations 
of said plaintiff's complaint and the whole thereof 
and alleges that plaintiff is not entitled to any part 
or portion of said North lj2 of the North lf:.. of the 
North ¥2\ of Lot 8, Block 22, T·en Acre Flat A (Tr. 8 
and 9). Upon the date of the trial of said cause, coun· 
sel for both sides made statements, but no evidence 
or testimony of any nature was taken. During the dis-
cussion between Court and couns-el, and before any nw-
tion for j1tdgment on the pleadings was made by counsel 
for plaintiff, counsel for defendant asked permission 
to amend his answer (Tr. 77) and such permission was 
objected to by counsel for plaintiff (Tr. 77). Counsel 
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for defendants then requested 24 hours in which to 
amend, and counsel for plaintiff again objected (Tr. 
78), and the Court stated that it would entertain a mo-
tion for judgment on the ·pleadings, and the motion 
being made, was granted by the Court without giving 
counsel for defendants the requested permission to 
amend his answer. The plaintiff had at no time de-
murred to defendants' answer, and there had been no 
opportunity to pass on the sufficiency of the pleadings 
up to that point. 
Subsequently, defendants made a motion to vacate 
the decree and for permission to amend the answer 
(Tr. 21), and made a motion for a new trial (Tr. 22), 
which were aU denied by the Court (Tr. 25). A written 
decree was thereafter entered quieting title in plaintiff 
(Tr. 27, 28 and 29), to property differently described 
than was de~cribed in the complaint (Tr. 1), the com-
plaint being different than the decre.e in that the de-
scription states that starting from a cerain point the 
property runs "North 76,775 feet ... ", the decree 
stating "North 76.775 feet ... ", and differing also in 
that the description in the complaint does not have the 
words "Ten-acre plat A", whereas the decree does, 
and differing also in that the description in the com-
plaint does not have the words ''to a point which is 
4.35 rods or 71.775 feet south of said northwest corner 
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of said lot 8 '' whereas the decree does, and differing 
also in that the description in the complaint does not 
contain the words ''to a point which is 151.55 feet south 
of the northeast corner of said lot 8, in block 22, 10-
acre Plat A, Big· Field Survey," whereas the decree 
does, and differing also in that the description in the 
complaint, or any part of the complaint contains the 
words ''Together with all improvements thereon, and 
all hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belong-
ing, and also together with 11;4 share of stock in the 
Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company, and all water 
and water rights represented by said 11,4 share of 
stock,'' whereas the decree does contain such quoted 
words and phrases. 
This decree was entered on October 18th, 1939, and 
thereafter and on November 2nd, 1939, defendants 
served and filed Notice of Motion wherein they pro-
posed to move the Court on November 18th, 1939, to re-
consider the motion to vacate decree and permission to 
amend answer (Tr. 34), and they set forth all the statu-
tory grounds previously set forth in their former mo-
tions (Tr. 21 and 22), a.dding in said Notice of Motion, 
however, an additional statutory ground, i.e., newly dis-
covered evidence, material for the applicant, which 
could not with reasonable diligence, be discovered and 
produced at the trial 
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In support of the motions for which said notice 
was served and filed, defendants tendered a verified 
amended answer (Tr. 47 to 53 incl.), and one of the 
appellants, Mr. Yeager, tendered his affidavit in sup-
port of the motions ( Tr. 54 to 61 incl.), setting forth 
reasons for having a trial on the merits. The matter 
was continued to take testimony in further support of 
the motions, and it was stipulated that the affidavit of 
Mr. Yeager (Tr. 54) stated facts to which he would 
testify if sworn (Tr. 83), and two witnesses were sworn 
in support of defendants' motion, Mr. Oscar J. Har-
line and l\1rs. Jessie B. Ence ( Tr. 8:5 to 97 incl.). Coun-
sel for defendants, at the hearing on said motions, also 
made motions in o:pen court to 1) reconsider the mo-
tions theretofore filed, and separately and independent-
ly and not by way of re-consideration, to 2) s·et aside 
and vacate the judgment, and to 3) grant a new trial, 
(Tr. 82), which motions were not objected to by counsel 
for respondent. (Tr. 82.) 
Thereafter, the various motions were denied by 
the court, and appellants appeal from all the rulings 
of the court and from the judgment on the pleadings 
given by the court in favor of respondent, and in 
attacking said rulings, respectfully represent as fol-
lows: 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
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MOTIO~ FOR JUDGnlENT ON THE PLEAD-
IXGS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND RE-
SPONDENT. 
A. It is subn1itted that the appellants and de-
fendants in their amended answer (Tr. 8) sufficiently 
denied the allegations of the complaint, to raise an 
issue requiring the taking of evidence and testimony. 
In answering paragraph 4 of the complaint, which was 
the paragraph claiming ownership and possession of the 
described property, the defendants stated: 
Also: 
''That dividing the property so conveyed from 
the property retained a fence had been con-
·structed by the defendants and was standing at 
the time of the conveyance a,bov.e mentioned and 
that said plaintiff has been in possession of the 
property conveyed south of said fence and no 
part of the plaintiff (defendants~) land has 
been in the poss·ession of said plaintiff.'' 
''So far as any conflict exists between property 
described above and within the fence line as 
hereinabove described these defendants deny the 
allegations of said plaintiff's complaint and the 
whole thereof and allege that plaintiff is not 
entitled to any part or portion of the said North 
lf2 of the North lj2 of the North lj2 of Lot 8, 
Block 22, Ten Acre Plat A, Big Field Surv·ey, 
:Salt Lake City, Utah." 
It is submitted that these allegations, though some-
what inartistic are certainly not admissions that plain-
tiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of 
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the property she described and certainly constitute de-
nials of any claim by plaintiff for land north of the 
fence line mentioned, and are diametrically opposed to 
an admission justifying judgment on the pleadings. 
Cases are legion holding that such an answer consti-
tutes a denial which raises an issue that must be tried 
to the court or jury, but inasmuch as our own Supreme 
Court has spoken it would seem inapropos to cite au-
thorities from other jurisdictions. In the case of 
Hancock vs. Luke, 148 Pac. 4.52; 46 
Utah 26, 1915, 
a case where an appeal was taken from judgment on 
the pleadings, the plaintiff, an .attorney, sued to rescind 
a contract to purchase stock, wherein, among other 
things, defendant had purportedly agreed to employ 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff praying that the contract be 
rescinded for fraud and misrepresentation. To the com-
plaint .an answer was filed containing lengthy allega-
tions, some of which admitted the contract and the al-
legations of the complaint, and some of which were 
inconsistent ther·ewith, the answer further denying each 
and every other allegation in said complaint contained. 
No demurrer had been interposed to the answer. Judg-
ment on the pleadings was given on motion of defen-
dant. Plaintiff asked leave to amend and such leave 
was denied. The court, among other things said: 
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"Under our statute, 'a pleading for the purpos·e 
of determining· its effect, its allegations must be 
liberally construed with a view to substantial 
justice between the parties. ' Com. Laws 1907, 
Sec. 2986. \Yhere it is clear, therefore that a 
denial of particular allegations of the complaint 
was intended, the mere form of such denial is 
not alwa~-s conclusiYe. '' 
The court also said: 
''The motion for judgment on the pleadings was, 
in legal effect, a general demurrer to the answer, 
and such demurrer searches the entire record, 
including the sufficiency of the complaint." 
The court commented on the fact that our statutes do 
not have a provision for a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, but that our courts have inherent power, 
independent of statute, to grant such a motion. But, 
said the court: 
"Motions for judgments on the pleadings ar;e, 
however, not favored by the courts, and upon 
such a motion the pleadings will be construed 
with great liberality in favor of the party whose 
pleadings are assailed,'' 
citing a number of cases, included in which was Giles 
vs. Recamier, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 354, a part of the opin-
ion of which the court quoted approvingly : 
"It is a dangerous practice to allow either party 
to interpose an oral demurrer at the trial, to 
the pleading of his adversary. If a pleading be 
substantially defective, the honest course is to 
demur to it, and thus give court and counsel a 
fair opportunity to examine and consider the 
question of law that is involved. If there be any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the 
pleading, the court should deny a motion that is 
sprung at the trial, for judgment on the plead-
ings." 
In our principal c;1se we have the same situation, ex-
cept that we have a stronger case for the application of 
the above principles, in view of the fact that in our 
principal case, appellants made application for permis-
sion to amend their answer prior to motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, (Tr. 77), wher-eas in the Han-
cock case, the motion for permission to amend came 
after the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 
it was because of the fact that the motion came after 
the judgment that Justice l\IcCarty dissented. In 
this connection, calling attention to Tr. 77 and 78, 
Mr. Cluff, counsel for defendants, said: "I am ask-
ing to amend, Your Honor,'' which wa.s objected to. 
Again Mr. Cluff said: "I ask the privilege of 24 
hours in which to prepare an amendment," which 
wa.s objected to and the Court immediately, with-
out further consideration, said it would ·entertain a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which motion 
was promptly granted. Justice Frick, in the majority 
opinion in the Hancock case, continued as follows: 
"If in this case, plaintiff had interposed a gen-
eral demurrer to the answer, and the court had 
sustained it, the defendants would have been 
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permitted to amend their answer as a matter 
of course, under the practice, if not a.s a matter 
of right. . . . In our judgment there is not a 
respectable attorney practicing in this jurisdic-
tion who would question the right of his adYer-
san~ to at least attempt to an1end a pleading 
after a general demurrer had been sustained by 
the court. Is there any reason for a different 
rule in ca&e of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings 1 \Ye confess our inability to discover 
an~· substantial difference between a general de-
murrer and a motion for judgment on the plead-
ing·s. insofar as the right to amend is conoerned. '' 
We commend also the other statements made in the 
case b~· ~Ir. Justice Frick and ~ir. Justice Straup, 
establishing the above principles in the State of Utah, 
but space does not permit further quotation. 
Another Utah case adhering to the doctrine above 
is that of 
Tooele Aleat Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 168 Pac. 
427, 57 Utah 1, 1917, 
wherein plaintiff sought to set aside a judgment ob-
tained in another case, claiming the complaint in the 
other action was based on fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. The defendant answered generally and in some 
instances specifically. The plaintiff did not put 1n any 
·evidence but the defendant did. The plaintiff, on ap-
peal, claims that judgment should have been given on 
the pleadings, and the court said : 
"Under our statutes (Com. Laws 1907, Sec. 
2986), the allegations and averments in plead~ 
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ings must be liberally construed. That s-ection 
reads: 
'In the construction of a pleading for the 
purpose of determining its effect, its alle-
gations must be liberally construed with a 
view to substantial justice between the 
parties.' 
If, therefore, we apply the provisions of that 
section to defendant's answer i.r this case it 
cannot be doubted that the answer does present 
an issue of fact and hence is sufficient to with-
stand a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
The court therefore did not err in refusing to 
enter judgm-ent for the plaintiff.'' 
Com. Laws 1907, Sec. 2986 is identical to Title 104-13-1, 
R. S. U. 1933. The pleadings in the above case are sub-
stantially similar to those of our principal case, and 
we submit that the decision in the Tooele case should 
apply to our cas·e. Another case re-iterating the Utah 
principle is that of 
Johnson v. 111ounta:in St. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
159 Pac. 526; 48 Utah 339, 
and many others from other jurisdictions which we 
feel need not be cited in view of the law of our own 
state. The above cited cases should conclusively deter-
mine our principal case and the error committed by the 
District Judge in granting judgment on the pleadings. 
II. THE DIJSTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS.t MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
FOR~fEH M01~IONS, AND IN DENYING AP-
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PELLANTS' INDEPENDENT MOTION FOR 
A KEW TRIAL AND TO VACATE JUDGMENT. 
As has been stated hereinabove, appellants moved 
the court to re-consider former motions for new trial, 
vacate judgment and permission to amend, ( Tr. 34) 
and also moved the court independently and S·epara tely 
for a new trial and to vacate the judgment (Tr. 82), 
and in support of these various motions presented new 
and additional statutory grounds, i.e., that of newly 
discovered evidence, and in further support of said 
motions tendered a ,·erified answer ( Tr. 4 7 to 53), an 
affidavit of one of the appellants (Tr. 54 to 61), and 
sworn testimony of two witnesses (Tr. 85 to 97), and 
introduced the abstract of title (Tr. 97). 
The case of Luke vs. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, was 
strongly urged by counsel for respondent as authority 
for the proposition that the court could not entertain 
said motions to re-consider and said motion for new 
trial and to vacate judgment. It is true, Luke vs. Cole-
man states that a motion to re-hear a motion for a new 
trial is foreign to our statutes on procedure, but the 
court in that case restricted its decision to motions to 
re-hear the very same thing on the very same grounds. 
Where additional grounds or new evidence is presented, 
Luke vs. Coleman is not applicable, the court acknowl-
edging its inapplicability in such case when it said: 
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'' According to some of these decisions, 
a s·econd application for a new trial may be 
made within the term in which the judgment was 
r-endered, when it is based on grounds not in-
cluded in the first application, and satisfactory 
reasons given for the omission. The plaintiff, 
however, did not proceed on the theory of a 
second application based on new grounds, but on 
the theory of a rehearing and a resubmission 
of the grounds already passed upon and ad-
judged on the first application .... " 
In our principal case there is no question but that new 
grounds were presented in support of a second appli-
cation, and an answer, affidavit, testimony and evi-
dence tendered in support thereof. In the original mo-
tions in our principal case no affidavit or answer was 
tendered. Luke vs. Coleman is not applicable in our 
principal case for the further reason that a more recent 
Utah case, that of 
Lund vs. Third District Court, 62 Pac. 
(2) 278, 90 Utah 433, 1935, 
r-educes Luke vs. Coleman to its own facts and none 
other. In the Lund case, a motion for a new trial had 
been denied during the term. After term time it was 
discovered that one of the jurors had been incompetent, 
and upon application for a new trial, based on accident 
and surprise, a new trial was granted, and the ruling 
upheld by our Supreme Court, on the principle that 
if ther-e be additional grounds presented in support of 
the motion and such grounds are meritorious, a new 
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trial may be granted regardless of the fact that a mo-
tion for a new trial had ·previously been denied. In 
our principal case sufficient additional grounds have 
been presented which were not mentioned in the pre-
Yious motion, to bring it within the purview of the 
Lund case. The appellants in bringing in witnesses in 
support of their motions also satisfied the rule in Utah 
that something in addition to the affidavits must be 
offered. It might be stated also, for what it may be 
worth, that in the Luke case the motion to re-hear 
was made long after term time, while in our principal 
case the motion to re-hear was made well within tenn 
time. 
We feel that quite apart from the Utah authorities 
the court abused its discretion in not relieving appel-
lants from the judgment entered. The Court, upon pre-
sentation of the motions and evidence tendered in sup-
port thereof, could have invoked the power given it 
under Title 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
providing for relief from a judgment, especially since 
the whole record indicates a willingness and desire on 
the part of the appellants to try the case on its merits 
and not merely on the pleadings. The tender of answer, 
of the affidavit, of costs, the various motions, and the 
bringing of witnesses into court would seem to dis-
close a desire to try the case, and certainly does not 
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evince a desire to have the case go by default by way 
of judgment on the pleadings. Surely the spirit of Title 
104-57-12, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, if not the 
lett.er thereof, was also abused by the District Judge in 
this case, when such statute states that the court in 
real property cases 
'' .... must not enter any judgment by default 
against unknown defendants, but must in all 
cases require e·vidence of plaintiff's title and 
possession and hear such evidence as may be 
offered respecting the claims and title of any 
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter 
judgment in accordance with the evidence and 
the law .... '' 
Surely, the appellants would ha.ve been better off in 
our principal case, in view of this statute, if they had 
not answered at all, for in that case the plaintiff would 
have been put to her proof by sworn testimony and 
evidence. A fortiori, where a defendant does answer, 
there is more reason to take evidence than where a de-
fault judgment is taken, and less reason to give judg-
ment on the pleadings as was done in our principal 
case without one word of testimony or evidence, but 
only upon confused ~Statements of counsel. 
The appellants have done about everything they 
could have done under the circumstances to attempt 
to bring this case to trial, and we submit that the 
Court abused its discretion in not allowing appellants 
their day in court. The books are full of authority sus-
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taining the power of a court during term to grant per-
mission to try a cause on its merits, where there may 
have been a technicality that temporarily impeded the· 
progress thereof. 
Vol. 3, Bancroft's Pract,ice, Chapter 
VII, pages 2432 et seq., 
15 Ruli11g Ca.se Lau:, page 688 et seq. 
On page 2433 of Bancroft it is stated: 
''Within proper limits and under proper cir-
cumstances eYery court of record has authority 
to vacate its own judgments. While it has been 
regulated to a large extent by legislation, this 
power is inherent and in some cases independent 
of statute. . . . '' 
And ev-en though a court may follow the statutory 
technique (p. 2459) : 
"Where a motion is based upon a ground which 
the court is held to have inherent power to va-
cate a judgment, as in case of fraud or the in-
advertence of the court, and not upon a statu-
tory ground, the power of the court is not gov-
erned by the statutory limitation as to time .... " 
and on page 2477: 
''On the other hand the circumstances 1nay be 
such as to make it an abuse of discretion to 
deny an application to open a default or set 
aside a judgment. If the moving party makes 
a clear and unquestionable showing that he has 
a good defense or cause of action on the merits, 
of the benefit of which he has been deprived 
without fault on his part, the court has little 
discretion in the matter and should it deny re-
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lief, its action may be set aside and proper relief 
ordered by the appellate court. . . . '' 
and on page 24 78 : 
''An appellate court is inclined to listen more 
readily to an appeal from an order denying re-
lief than one granting relief, because of the 
policy of applying remedial statutes liberally to 
permit a trial on the merits .... '' 
.... It is the undoubted general rule that this 
power should be exercised liberally in further-
ance of justice and in view of the policy of the 
law and the statutes governing relief, to have 
cases disposed of on their merits rather than 
upon technicalities and fortuitous circumstances . 
. . . If reasonable minds might differ as to the 
propriety of setting aside a judgment upon a 
proper and timely application and showing, the 
doubt should be resolved in f-avor of the appli-
cant.'' 
and see also page 248:9 which states as a general prin-
ciple the doctrine of Lund vs. Third District Court, and 
see also the Ruling Case Law citations, principally at 
page 688, 689, and 708. 
It is therefore submitted that in the light of the 
Lund case, the statutes of Utah, and the general author-
ities cited, the Court abused its discretion in giving 
judgment on the pleadings and in refusing to g-rant a 
new trial and permit amendment of the answer, and in 
refusing to grant a new trial and vacate judgm·ent when 
new, additional and o·bviously meritorious grounds were 
presented,-and in this respect may it be pointed out 
that the answer, affidavit and evidence tendered by ap-
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pellants were not resisted by counter-affidavit or 
counter-evidence or reply of any nature on the part of 
respondent. 
III. THE DECREE ENTERED BY THE COURT IS 
FATALLY AT VARIA.NCE WITH THE CON-
TEXT A~D PRAYER OF THE COMPLAINT. 
The discrepancies pointed out in the '' Introduc-
tion" herein above, it is submitted, make it obvious 
that the Court went far afield in its judgment in grant-
ing more relief and inserting more description than 
called for in the complaint. It is also obvious that the 
property described in the complaint, although the 
"North 76,775 feet" probably was intended for "North 
76.775," the comma being a pro.bable ·error, is vastly 
different in size and shape than that described in the 
decree. True, the use of the comma in the description 
instead of a period may have been an error, but there 
was no effort to amend the description, and the same 
has never been amended, and we submit that if the 
respondent is ·willing to rely on a technicality based 
on inartistic wording of an answer when the meaning 
was obviously to deny the complaint, then surely the 
appellants should be entitled to rely on the misplace-
ment of a comma in order to have their day in court. 
It is further submitted that a calculation of the area 
as described in the decree of the court makes for a 
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discrepancy with the area described In the deed to re-
spondent. Surely the court erred in giving the re-
spondent more land in its decre.e than was called for in 
the deed, when the court itself gave judgment on the 
pleadings ostensibly based on the descriptions in the 
deeds. 
With respect to the merit of appellants' theory 
with respect to reformation as shown in their tendered 
amended answer, it is unnecessary to cite authorities 
here in support of the principles with respect to natural 
monuments, mutual mistake, estoppel, fence-line law 
and the like, but it is submitted that appellants, in their 
tendered amended answer, affidavit, evidence and 
proof, have certainly set forth matters which, if they 
had been presented in the first instance would have 
called for a trial on the merits. Hence, since there is 
no question with respect to the merit of appellants' 
proposed defense and prayer for relief, counsel feels 
that the questions of abuse of discretion, granting of 
n~w trials, sufficiency of pleadings with respect to 
judgments on the pleading and the like should be the 
only questions presented to this court as has been 
attempted hereinabove. 
In conclusion, we submit that a careful reading of 
the transcript from beginning to end and examination 
of the pleadings, the discourses of counsel and the other 
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matters contailH_•d in this cast>, will 1nake obvious the 
desire of the appellants to have their day in court, nnd 
the denial of that right through no fault of their own. 
We feel that this matter, which vitally affects the sub-
stantial property rights of the parties, should be sent 
back to the lower court with instructions to allow ap-
pellants to file an amended answer and have this case 
tried on sworn testimony, evidence and fact, and not 
upon the bickerings of counsel and court on matters 
which the record obviously discloses led to confusion 
and misunderstanding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. HE·NRI HENRIOD, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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